Bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Introduction
The Supreme Court dealt with the scope and preconditions for invoking Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The case revolvd around whether the complainant had complied with the mandatory procedural requirements laid down in Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of the CrPC before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3), and whether the High Court had erred in dismissing the quashing petition of the appellants.
Facts of the Case
The second respondent filed a complaint before the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, alleging offences under Sections 420 and 120-B of the IPC. Acting on the complaint, the Judicial Magistrate directed the police to register an FIR through an order dated 14 June 2017 The appellants filed a quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which was dismissed. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the Supreme Court, contending that the Magistrate's order was passed without ensuring compliance with mandatory requirements under Section 154 CrPC, in violation of precedent.
Issues Before the Court
- Whether the complainant had complied with the mandatory requirements under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3)?
- Whether the Magistrate's order directing registration of FIR was valid in the absence of such compliance?
- Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the quashing petition, ignoring the binding precedent in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (2015)?
Contentions of the Petitioners
The appellants argued that the complainant had not complied with the prerequisites under Section 154(1) and 154(3) before invoking Section 156(3). Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's decision in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (2015), especially paragraph 27, which mandates due compliance and supporting material (affidavits, documents). Further reference was made to Babu Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka (2022), which reaffirmed the same position.
Contentions of the Respondents
The second respondent’s senior counsel conceded that Section 154(3) was not explicitly invoked, but claimed substantive compliance was made. It was submitted that a written complaint had been given to the Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh, and marked to the Economic Offences Wing on 29 January 2014, as reflected in paragraph 14 of the complaint. They argued that despite lack of formal averments, the essence of prior steps was satisfied.
Court’s Analysis
The Court revisited the statutory scheme of Section 154 CrPC:
- Section 154(1) requires a complainant to first approach the officer in charge of a police station regarding a cognizable offence.
- Section 154(3) applies only if the officer refuses to register the FIR, in which case the complainant must approach higher police authorities.
The Court held that non-compliance with these steps renders a complaint under Section 156(3) premature. The Court emphasized that the decision in Priyanka Srivastava (2015) is a binding precedent that must be followed. Therein, it was held that specific averments and documents indicating prior compliance are mandatory. The Court found that in this case, neither the complaint contained explicit averments nor supporting documents to show that Section 154(1) and (3) were followed. Therefore, the Magistrate’s order directing registration of FIR was held to be erroneous. The High Court had overlooked binding precedent, thereby committing a jurisdictional error in dismissing the quashing petition.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court quashed the impugned order of the High Court. The Magistrate’s direction to register the FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC was also set aside. The Court reiterated that remedies under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) must be exhausted and expressly mentioned in the complaint before invoking Section 156(3). The case reinforces the mandatory nature of procedural safeguards and the binding force of precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution.
