Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar, a journalist at Blitz, wrote an article alleging that businessman Krishnaraj M.D. Thackersey manipulated the import of silk yarn for personal gain, using fabricated documents and black market dealings. Thackersey filed a defamation suit against the magazine.
During the trial, defense witness Bhaichand G. Goda supported Blitz’s claims but requested the court to prohibit the publication of his statements, fearing business losses. The court accepted his request and orally barred Blitz from reporting his testimony. When Blitz demanded a written order, the court refused.
Arguing that this order violated their right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a), the journalists challenged it in the High Court through a writ petition, but it was dismissed. They then approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, contending that the restriction on publishing Goda’s statements not only curbed press freedom but also denied the public access to crucial information.
Issue before the Court
The issue before the Court was-
- Maintainability of Writ Petition – Whether the challenged judicial order can be questioned through a writ petition and if the current petitions are maintainable.
- Violation of Fundamental Rights – Whether the impugned order infringes the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 and if the restrictions imposed are legally justified.
Arguments by the petitioner
The petitioners, contended that Article 32 allows individuals to seek remedies when their fundamental rights are violated, even by the judiciary. Since the court's order restricted their right to free speech under Article 19(1), they had the right to challenge it through a writ petition. They cited Articles 20, 21, and 22(1) to argue that courts are not immune from such challenges.
The petitioners also argued that the restriction on freedom of speech was unjustified. They claimed that the order had no legal basis under Articles 19(2) to 19(6), which specify reasonable restrictions on free speech. Since there was no valid reason to limit press freedom in this case, the order was unconstitutional.
Arguments by the Respondents
The respondents argued that the petitions were not maintainable. They contended that writ petitions under Article 32 can only be filed against the "state," but the judiciary is not considered a "state" under Article 12. Therefore, the petitioners could not challenge a judicial order through Article 32. They also argued that the judge had the inherent power to ensure a fair trial. The restriction on publication was necessary to protect the witness from undue distress, which could affect his testimony and the overall justice process.
Furthermore, they maintained that the restriction on publication was a reasonable limitation on free speech under Article 19(2). They argued that witness statements should not be publicized if doing so could lead to public unrest or harm the witness. Courts have the discretion to impose such restrictions in the interest of justice.
Analysis of the Court
The Supreme Court ruled that a judicial order does not violate the fundamental rights of citizens under Article 19(1). The court emphasized that judicial decisions made by a competent judge in the course of adjudication cannot be considered as infringing fundamental rights. If a litigant is aggrieved by such an order, the proper remedy is to file an appeal under Article 136, not to claim a violation of fundamental rights. The nature of a judicial order remains the same, whether it is passed on the merits of the case or as an incidental order to ensure fair proceedings. Therefore, the argument that the impugned order violates Article 19(1) was rejected.
Further, the court clarified that if a High Court's judicial order affects a third party, that party can challenge it through an appeal under Article 136, but not by invoking the Supreme Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 32. The High Court, as a superior Court of Record under Article 215, has the inherent power to decide on its jurisdiction and punish contempt. The Supreme Court held that its writ jurisdiction under Article 32 does not extend to correcting judicial orders passed by High Courts in pending proceedings. While Article 32 grants broad powers, the court concluded that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued against judicial orders of High Courts. As a result, the petitions were dismissed.
Concluding Remark
This ruling became a landmark precedent, reaffirmed in later cases such as A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) and Ajit Kumar Barat v. Secretary, Indian Tea Association (2001). The Supreme Court consistently held that judicial proceedings of superior courts are not subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 32, as one bench of the Supreme Court is not subordinate to another. The judgment established that certiorari cannot be used to quash judicial orders made by courts of competent jurisdiction, solidifying its authority in constitutional law.
