Shah Bano, a 62-year-old woman from Madhya Pradesh, was divorced by her husband in 1978. After the divorce, she filed a case seeking maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which allows a person unable to maintain themselves to claim support. The Supreme Court ruled in her favor and held that she was entitled to maintenance, even though she was a Muslim woman. This judgment recognized the rights of Muslim women to claim alimony under general law.
However, in response to the judgment, the Parliament passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act in 1986. This new law stated that a Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance only during the “Iddat” period (a short period after divorce), and not beyond that. This law overturned the Supreme Court’s decision in Shah Bano’s case and denied her any further maintenance.
Shah Bano’s lawyer, Danial Latifi, challenged the Act, arguing that it went against the Constitution. He said it violated Article 21 (Right to Life), because it failed to ensure financial security for divorced women, and Articles 14 and 15, as it treated Muslim women differently from women of other religions. He filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court, questioning the constitutional validity of the 1986 Act for denying equal protection and maintenance rights to Muslim women.
Issue before the Court
The case questioned whether Section 3(1) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, violated Articles 14 (equality), 15 (no discrimination), and 21 (right to life and dignity) of the Indian Constitution. It also raised doubts about the overall constitutional validity of the Act.
You can also read the Judgement of Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (AIR 1984 SC 802)
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Arguments of the Appellant
The petitioner argued that Section 125 of the CrPC provides maintenance to all divorced women, regardless of religion, and is essential for protecting their right to live with dignity (Article 21). Denying this benefit to Muslim women under the 1986 Act was discriminatory and violated the principles of equality and secularism in Articles 14 and 15.
Arguments of the Respondent
The Respondent argued that the challenge was not about personal law but about a separate legal provision meant to address the needs of Muslim women. The Act, according to the State, was constitutionally valid and created with a specific social and legal context in mind.
Analysis of the Court
In this case, the Court examined how Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) relates to the personal laws under Muslim law. Section 125 CrPC aims to prevent homelessness and poverty by making it mandatory for people who can afford it to provide financial support to those who cannot support themselves, including divorced wives. The Court emphasized that this law is meant to ensure that no one, including a divorced Muslim woman, is left helpless or without basic support.
Referring to the Shah Bano case, the Court explained that the reason behind Section 125 is to protect divorced women from falling into poverty or becoming destitute, and this applies to Muslim women as well. The Court clarified that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act applies only to those women who were married and divorced under Muslim personal law. It does not apply to women whose marriages were under other laws like the Special Marriage Act or Indian Divorce Act.
Importantly, the Court held that a Muslim husband is responsible for making a fair and reasonable provision for his divorced wife’s future. This includes maintenance and is not limited to the iddat period (the waiting period after divorce). This provision must be made within the iddat period, but it covers expenses beyond it.
If the woman remains unmarried and is unable to maintain herself after the iddat period, she can seek maintenance from her relatives, like her children or parents, according to Section 4 of the Act. The amount they need to pay depends on the share they would inherit from her under Muslim law. If none of the relatives can provide maintenance, the court can order the State Wakf Board to take responsibility.
Lastly, the Court made it clear that the provisions under this Act do not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 (equality before law), 15 (prohibition of discrimination), and 21 (protection of life and personal liberty) of the Indian Constitution.
